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Abstract 
John H. Herz (1908-2005) is better known for his theorisation of the security dilemma than for his 
conviction that human survival is threatened by the conditions of late modernity. This article 
explores extinction and survival in his work to interrogate his persistent characterisation as an 
incorrigible pessimist. In his preoccupation with extinction, Herz would seem a first-rank pessimist, 
but his intellectual commitments belie this easy categorisation. Specifically, his appeals to 
interdisciplinary ‘survival research’ suggest a qualified pessimism that does not foreclose on the 
potential of humankind to overcome structural, political and normative obstacles.  This is consistent 
with current understandings of pessimism with the broader realist tradition. Herz expressed an 
‘open’ and ‘linear’ temporality that challenges cyclical and linear-progressive temporalities inherent 
to realism and liberalism, respectively. Herz articulates, therefore, a ‘productive pessimism’ that 
charts a different path for pessimist thought beyond its pejorative connotations. This article 
contributes to the literature on classical realism, to a growing interest in Herz’s intellectual legacy, 
and to the developing appreciation of time and temporality in International Relations theory and 
practice. It also provides a foundation for rethinking our assumptions about pessimism and 
international politics. 
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Introduction 
Realist thought is often denigrated through its association with pessimism. Pessimism connotes 
resignation in the face of intractable human conflict, where cynicism substitutes for scholarly 
scepticism, and which fatalism shades into nihilistic acceptance of the futility of political action. 
Understood in this way, realism discloses a particular temporality, a cyclical and tragic historical 
time-consciousness, in which humankind is doomed to repeat its mistakes ad nauseam. Whilst 
recent scholarship has sought to disturb this conventional reading of realism, particularly in its 
‘classical’ guise, the suspicion remains that realism is broadly locked into a pessimistic view of 
human affairs that limits our collective ability to imagine more encouraging political futures.  
 
An interesting test case of this assumption is the work of John H. Herz (1908-2005). Herz is best 
known for his formulation of the ‘security dilemma’, in which polities’ actions to increase their 
security lead to spirals of countermeasures fuelled by uncertainty and fear, potentially leading to 
war. This is doubtless a pessimistic reading of political affairs, in common with other ‘classical 
realists’ with whom he is usually categorised. Herz was a pessimist, given his long-standing concern 
with the possible extinction of the human species and the apparent inability of international politics 
to prevent this eventuality. Yet, throughout his long and productive career, Herz articulated 
pathways to alternative futures that belie the characterisation of pessimism as a barren and 
disreputable mode of thought. Far from being content to find the worst in all things, Herz the 
pessimist sought practical measures to shape international politics, precisely so as to deny the 
consummation of his dark visions of humanity’s future. Herz was convinced the twin perils of nuclear 
annihilation and environmental degradation posed existential threats to humanity, with extinction 
certain unless humankind directed its intellectual and material resources to averting this 
catastrophe. If power politics were to prevail over a truly ‘realistic’ and ethical approach to global 
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affairs, the outcome would be stark: ‘Exeunt omnes. Finis.’1 Herz proposed a novel, interdisciplinary 
programme of ‘Survival Research’ as a means of parlaying pessimism into an ethics of survival and 
thence into political action. Through an exploration of Herz’s preoccupations with extinction and 
survival, this article attempts to rehabilitate pessimism as a productive mode of international theory 
and practice and to enquire after its temporal commitments and orientation. 
 
The article begins by setting out the problem of pessimism in International Relations (IR) and what is 
at stake in understanding better this commonplace term. This introductory section pays attention to 
work assigning specific forms of temporality to pessimism, especially within classical realism with 
which Herz is commonly identified. This is followed by a discussion of John Herz’s pessimistic 
assertions about the implications for human extinction and survival of nuclear weapons and 
environmental threats. The article then turns to his early identification of an ethics of survival, which 
was channelled into his conceptualisation of Survival Research. Although Survival Research remains 
unrealised, the article proposes that we understand Herz’s pessimism as socially and politically 
productive, and demonstrating not a withdrawal from the world but a wilful engagement with it. The 
final substantive sections draw attention to the implications of this argument for thinking about 
pessimism and temporality, and for IR, particularly with respect to the Anthropocene. 
Pessimism, time and temporality 
Joshua Foa Dienstag observes that political and philosophical pessimists are often dismissed because 
they lack a ‘positive project’ for humankind.2 They are viewed as ‘dissenters from whatever the 
prevailing consensus of their time happens to be, rather than as constituting a continuous 
                                                          
1 John H. Herz, ‘Power Politics and Policies of Survival’, in Power and Policy in Transition: Essays Presented on 
the Tenth Anniversary of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy in Honor of Its Founder, Hans J. 
Morgenthau, ed. Vojtech Mastny (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984), 52. 
2 Joshua Foa Dienstag, Pessimism: Philosophy, Ethic, Spirit (Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University 
Press, 2006), 4. 
5 
 
alternative’.3 This negative framing of pessimism leads to a demotion of pessimist thought in political 
philosophy and its derivative fields, and to its conformity with the everyday understanding of 
pessimism as a psychological tendency to find the worst in life or to believe in its worst possible 
outcomes. In this respect, pessimism is derided ‘more as a disposition than as a theory’.4 Pessimists 
are nay-sayers or cynics, interesting but cranky voices, whose personal predilections preclude their 
ability to provide systematic frameworks for political and ethical conduct in a complex world.5 At the 
extreme, the pessimist is subject to contempt and accused of mental pathology, as in George 
Bernard Shaw’s excoriating description of a pessimist as ‘A man who thinks everybody is as nasty as 
himself, and hates them for it’.6  
 
These pejorative connotations deter most people’s self-identification as pessimistic and it ordinarily 
falls to external observers to diagnose this debilitating intellectual disease. Unsurprisingly, realist IR, 
given its identification of the intractability of conflict, is a rich hunting ground for anyone seeking 
pessimistic readings of the human condition. As is well established, political realism is imbued with a 
sense of tragedy, which, in its ancient Greek roots, communicates both the injustice afflicting the 
suffering innocent and the ‘disastrous consequences’ of attempting to limit suffering through the 
acquisition of ever-greater power and knowledge.7 This tragic sensibility manifests in classical 
political realism as pessimism ‘regarding moral progress and human possibilities’.8 Seán Molloy 
demonstrates, for instance, how Hans Morgenthau’s writing on power and morality is shot through 
with pessimistic assumptions about the ‘ubiquity of evil’ in public life that compromises all efforts to 
                                                          
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. See also Paul Prescott, ‘What Pessimism Is’, Journal of Philosophical Research 37 (2012): 337-56. 
5 Mark Gismondi, ‘Tragedy, Realism, and Postmodernity: Kulturpessimismus in the Theories of Max Weber, E.H. 
Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau, and Henry Kissinger’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 15, no. 3 (2004): 435-64. 
6 George Bernard Shaw, An Unsocial Socialist (London: Constable, 1932 [1883]), 67. 
7 Richard Ned Lebow, The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 20. 
8 Robert Gilpin, ‘The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism’, International Organization 38, no. 2 (1984): 
290. 
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attain social justice.9 There is a ‘tragic presence of evil in all political action’, Morgenthau asserted in 
Scientific Man Versus Power Politics.10 If, in politics, one can only choose the ‘lesser evil’, this is an 
intensely pessimistic perspective on humanity and the potentialities of political action. Neorealists 
are inclined to reach similar conclusions but from an alternative premise. Rather than grounding the 
inevitability of conflict in flawed human nature, neorealists see tragic outcomes as symptomatic of 
international anarchy.11 For all realists, tragedy is compounded by ‘blindness to the realities of 
international affairs’,12 whether the source of this myopia is moral degeneracy or inattention to the 
structural qualities of international affairs.  
 
A review of pessimism across the broad landscape of IR is beyond the present enquiry but political 
realism claims no monopoly on pessimism. The critical tradition inspired by the Frankfurt School has 
frequently managed to over-ride the anthropological pessimism of its progenitors – Adorno and 
Horkheimer, in particular – but still shares their profound disquiet with the contemporary 
condition.13  Recent scholarship has read into classical realism and critical theory a shared concern 
                                                          
9 Seán P. Molloy, ‘Aristotle, Epicurus, Morgenthau and the Political Ethics of the Lesser Evil’, Journal of 
International Political Theory 5, no. 1 (2009): 94-112. See also Michael Spirtas, ‘A House Divided: Tragedy and 
Evil in Realist Theory’, Security Studies 5, no. 3 (1996): 385-423; Chris Brown, ‘Tragedy, “Tragic Choices” and 
Contemporary International Political Theory’, International Relations 21, no. 1 (2007): 5-13; Mark Evans, ‘Doing 
Evil Justly? The Morality of Justifiable Abomination’, in Evil in Contemporary Political Theory, eds. Bruce 
Haddock, Peri Roberts and Peter Sutch (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 124-42. 
10 Hans Morgenthau, Scientific Man Versus Power Politics (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1946), 203. 
11 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001). On the differing 
pessimistic assumptions of offensive and defensive neorealism, see Eric J. Hamilton and Brian C. Rathbun, 
‘Scarce Differences: Toward a Material and Systemic Foundation for Offensive and Defensive Realism’, Security 
Studies 22, no. 3 (2013): 436-65. For an argument against interpreting neorealism as pessimistic, see Charles L. 
Glaser, ‘Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help’, Security Studies 5, no. 3 (1996): 122-63.  
12 Hans Morgenthau, ‘The Political Science of E.H. Carr’, World Politics 1, no. 1 (1948): 127. 
13 Jim George and David Campbell, ‘Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of Difference: Critical Social Theory 
and International Relations’, International Studies Quarterly 34, no. 3 (1990): 269-93; Chris Brown, ‘“Turtles All 
the Way Down”: Anti-Foundationalism, Critical Theory and International Relations’, Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies 23, no. 2 (1994): 213-36; Martin Weber, ‘The Critical Social Theory of the Frankfurt 
School, and the “Social Turn” in IR’, Review of International Studies 31, no. 1 (2005): 195-209. 
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with challenging, and ultimately subverting, the status quo.14 Hans Morgenthau, in particular, has 
been singled out for critical rehabilitation, although other scholars are less sanguine about the 
appropriateness of this move.15 What political realism and critical theory do share, however, is a 
civilizational pessimism, articulated by Weber as a fin-de-siècle ‘disenchantment’ with the 
instrumental rationalism of secular, bureaucratic and scientistic society.16 This is often expressed as 
disillusion with ‘progress’ and what Raymond Aron called the ‘Promethean ambition’ of modernity.17 
In this political order, nature can be tamed by rationalism – of left or right – and by the proper 
application of science and technology. Most such hopes were dashed by the catastrophes of the 
twentieth century and, in Kahler’s terms, ‘produced pessimism regarding the power of human 
reason to comprehend the realm of international competition and to contain the passions of 
ideology and nationalism.’18  
 
At work in the realist mind is an historical time-consciousness emerging from a particular 
appreciation of temporality. Realism as commonly apprehended is pessimistic in that its ontological 
commitments to anarchy and irredeemable human nature preclude positive outcomes that would 
undercut those same commitments. This is something of a vicious circle, as noted by realism’s many 
critics. For this reason, Hom and Steels identify the temporality of realism as ‘closed’, a condition 
                                                          
14 Muriel Cozette, ‘Reclaiming the Critical Dimension of Realism: Hans J. Morgenthau on the Ethics of 
Scholarship’, Review of International Studies 34, no. 1 (2008): 5-27; Felix Rösch, ‘The Human Condition of 
Politics: Considering the Legacy of Hans J. Morgenthau for International Relations’, Journal of International 
Political Theory 9, no. 1 (2013): 1-21; Milan Babík, ‘Realism as Critical Theory: The International Thought of E. 
H. Carr’, International Studies Review 15, no. 4 (2013): 491-514; Felix Rösch, ‘Realism as Social Criticism: The 
Thinking Partnership of Hannah Arendt and Hans Morgenthau’, International Politics 50, no. 6 (2013): 815-29. 
For a sceptical perspective, see Kamila Stullerova, ‘Embracing Ontological Doubt: The Role of “Reality” in 
Political Realism’, Journal of International Political Theory 13, no. 1 (2017): 59-80 
15 Daniel J. Levine, ‘Why Hans Morgenthau Was Not a Critical Theorist (and Why Contemporary IR Realists 
Should Care)’, International Relations 27, no. 1 (2013): 95-118. 
16 To which we might add Durkheimian anomie and Marxist alienation; George Lawson and Robbie Shilliam, 
‘Sociology and International Relations: Legacies and Prospects’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 23, 
no. 1 (2010): 69-86. 
17 Raymond Aron, The Century of Total War (London: Derek Verschoyle, 1954), 117-18. 
18 Miles Kahler, ‘Rationality in International Relations’, International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 919. 
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affecting liberal notions of historical development also.19 Whereas liberal thought is bound up with 
teleological notions of inevitable progress, realism instantiates a cyclical vision of historical time, yet 
each is closed in that they deny the possibility of escape from the historical path each is on. 
Importantly for the present discussion, however, is Hom and Steele’s observation that this does not 
apply to all forms of realism. Specifically, they diagnose of classical realists, amongst whom they 
include John Herz, an unwillingness to become locked into a closed version of historical time. 
Instead, classical realists – from Thucydides and Machiavelli to Niebuhr and Morgenthau – embrace, 
for better or for worse, the messiness and contingency of social life. This is both in a descriptive 
sense – what are the temporalities of social life? – and, crucially for classical realism, ‘as an internal 
resource for skeptical, prudent, ethical, and creative political practice’.20  
 
Dienstag makes a similar point yet reaches a different conclusion regarding the temporal topology of 
pessimism. In his dissection of the complex interrelationship between realism and pessimism, he 
draws attention to the distinct temporality of pessimism.21 The pessimist, he argues, cannot be 
synonymous with the realist, although they overlap in many ways, not least in their appeals to 
innate disorder. For the realist, particularly the neorealist, disorder exists because of the absence of 
order, not because anarchy itself has any ‘positive ontological weight’.22 This renders a realist 
understanding of the world descriptive rather than explanatory. It is also atemporal, as no account 
can be given of the emergence of disorder or its change over time. In contrast, the pessimist 
understands disorder to be the natural condition of the world, borne of a temporality of perpetual 
change. In this sense, pessimism derives from a positive ontological commitment to unstable 
temporality as the source of international disorder and international affairs in general. Pessimism 
finds inspiration in time, rather than the moral geometries of conventional realism, imposed as the 
                                                          
19 Andrew R. Hom and Brent J. Steele, ‘Open Horizons: The Temporal Visions of Reflexive Realism’, 
International Studies Review 12, no. 2 (2010): 271-300. 
20 Ibid., 280. 
21 Joshua Foa Dienstag, ‘Pessimistic Realism and Realistic Pessimism’, in Political Thought and International 
Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme, ed. Duncan Bell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008): 159-76. 
22 Ibid., 166. 
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latter are from above. Herz himself hints that the core theoretical models of realism, including his 
own, are epiphenomenal. He described even the quintessentially realist structure of the security 
dilemma, for example, as ‘a sociopsychological constellation’, rather than an ontological given.23 
 
Dienstag is clear this is not an ‘anything goes’ situation. Whilst not linear in the liberal-progressivist 
sense, pessimist temporality is linear because it recognises the post-Newtonian idea of time as linear 
and entropic, and, necessarily therefore, the ‘time-bound character of life and consciousness’.24 We 
are thereby presented with a pessimistic temporality that is both open and linear, yet not linear-
progressive. This conceptualisation also serves to distinguish between ‘tragic’ realism and ‘pessimist’ 
realism: unlike the former, pessimism is ‘not a theory of an evil beginning, but rather a theory that 
refuses to guarantee a happy ending’.25 As Dienstag indicates, pessimism is not an excuse for inertia: 
‘firemen always have plenty to do’.26 
Extinction and survival 
With this in mind, we can reconsider Van Munster and Sylvest’s characterisation of John Herz as a 
‘card-carrying realist and professional pessimist’.27 Herz was, in his own words, both a realist and a 
pessimist. Of the latter condition, he claimed to have been pessimistic even before leaving Nazi 
Germany in 1939, and certainly before the atomic attacks of 1945.28 His biographer, Jana Puglierin, 
describes pessimism as ‘a red thread’ running through his work.29 In many respects, John Herz 
conforms to the expected profile of a mid-century classical realist: he was disenchanted with 
                                                          
23 John H. Herz, ‘An Internationalist’s Journey Through the Century’, in Journeys Through World Politics: 
Autobiographical Reflections of Thirty-Four Academic Travellers, eds. Joseph Kruzel and James N. Rosenau 
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), 250. 
24 Dienstag, ‘Pessimistic Realism’, 161. 
25 Ibid., 162-3. 
26 Ibid., 172. 
27 Rens van Munster and Casper Sylvest, Nuclear Realism: Global Political Thought During the Thermonuclear 
Revolution (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 78. 
28 John H. Herz, The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics: Essays on International Politics in the 
Twentieth Century (New York: David McKay, 1976), 8. 
29 Jana Puglierin, John H. Herz: Leben und Denken zwischen Idealismus und Realismus, Deutschland und 
Amerika (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2011), 121. 
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modernity and notions of progress, appalled by the horrors of World War II, and pessimistic about 
the likelihood of humankind overcoming its evident flaws to avoid future tragedies. Kahler observes 
that European emigrés either side of World War II were more pessimistic than most about the 
potential of reason to ‘curb the violent tendencies of world politics’.30 It is unsurprising the Shoah, in 
particular, should cast its darkness across the work of German-Jewish intellectuals caught up in this 
migration. One of those was Hans Morgenthau, another John Herz, both now considered core 
classical realists.31 Small wonder these scholars might be given to pessimism regarding worldly 
events.  
 
Even before the nuclear strikes against Japan in August 1945, Herz had wondered whether the 
human species, on account of its perpetual recourse to conflict and violence, ‘may turn out to have 
been among Nature’s abortive attempts to create a species capable of survival’.32 This concern with 
survival is a pronounced feature of Herz’s work, although this alone is insufficient to mark him out 
from his peers; in one register or another, a concern with survival has always been central to IR. 
Martin Wight, in a famous provocation to disciplinary advancement, asserted in 1960, ‘International 
theory is the theory of survival’.33 In classical IR, states maximise their security in order to survive the 
condition of international anarchy, engendering an ‘ethos of survival’ that perpetuates competition 
and conflict.34 This dynamic was formalised by Herz himself as the ‘security dilemma’, often regarded 
as the primary explanans of international behaviour.35  
 
                                                          
30 Miles Kahler, ‘Rationality in International Relations’, International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 920. 
31 Richard Ned Lebow, ‘German Jews and American Realism’, Constellations: An International Journal of Critical 
and Democratic Theory 18, no. 4 (2011): 545-66. 
32 John H. Herz, ‘Power Politics and World Organization’, American Political Science Review 36, no. 6 (1942): 
1042. 
33 Martin Wight, ‘Why is There No International Theory?’, International Relations 2, no. 1 (1960): 48. 
34 Louiza Odysseos, ‘Dangerous Ontologies: The Ethos of Survival and Ethical Theorizing in International 
Relations’, Review of International Studies 28, no. 2 (2002): 403-18. 
35 Originally articulated in John H. Herz, ‘Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma’, World Politics 2, 
no. 2 (1950): 157-80. On the contemporaneous contribution of historian Herbert Butterfield, see Ken Booth 
and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 21-41. 
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The logical antithesis of survival is extinction, as Wight recognised in his binding of survival into ‘the 
ultimate experience of life and death, national existence and national extinction’.36 Herz was explicit 
in his attention to extinction, which, unsurprisingly, was grounded in his extreme anxiety about the 
new nuclear weapons, first atomic, and then thermonuclear. Nor was Herz alone in this respect 
either. Michael Howard recalls, for instance, one scholarly effect of the ‘threat of total annihilation’, 
when, in 1958, he co-founded a well-known journal, ‘whose bleak title Survival indicated our view of 
the seriousness of the situation’.37 President Harry S. Truman commented memorably a year after 
the first Alamogordo atomic tests, that ‘mankind must change now or he faces absolute and 
complete destruction and maybe the insect age or an atmosphereless planet will succeed him’.38 We 
need not look far for numerous other examples of pessimism, apocalypticism or resignation 
regarding international affairs under the thermonuclear shadow. 
 
Survival and extinction were integral to international political thought during the early years of the 
thermonuclear era. Where Herz differed was in his attention to the nature of extinction, to the 
referent of the term itself. Audra Mitchell has shown that extinction concerns in IR have centred on 
the survival of ‘particular states’, not with the elimination of ‘stateness’ itself.39 In this ontic register, 
IR fails to address the ontological status of non-survival as the irreversible erasure of the conditions 
that enable humans and their institutions, and of all modes of life.40 Herz did not commit this error. 
Instead, he asserted the twin perils of nuclear weapons and environmental catastrophe to the future 
of life on Earth. In either case, the ‘globe is in danger of becoming uninhabitable’.41 In both 
                                                          
36 Wight, ‘Why is There No International Theory?’, 48. 
37 Michael Howard, Captain Professor: A Life in War and Peace (London: Continuum, 2006), 161. 
38 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin, 2005), 53.  
39 Audra Mitchell, ‘Is IR Going Extinct?’, European Journal of International Relations 23, no. 1 (2017): 9. On 
state survival motives, see Burak Kadercan, ‘Making Sense of Survival: Refining the Treatment of State 
Preferences in Neorealist Theory’, Review of International Studies 39, no. 4 (2013): 1015-37. 
40 Mitchell, ‘Is IR Going Extinct?’, 9-10. 
41 John H. Herz, ‘Foreign Policy and Human Survival’, in United States Foreign Policy at the Crossroads, ed. 
George Schwab (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 167. 
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instances, his arguments resolved not to the primary importance attached by conventional realists 
to the state but to species-level concerns with extinction and survival. 
 
Herz was too cautious an analyst to claim that nuclear weapons changed everything but they clearly 
changed much.42 In his analysis, their principal challenge to international politics was to the integrity 
of the state itself, which nuclear weapons rendered permeable to exogenous destructive power on 
an existential scale. According to Herz, ‘we are approaching the era of absolute exposure, with 
neither walls nor moats, in which penetration in its extreme [i.e. nuclear] form will mean not mere 
damage or change but utter annihilation of life and way of life’.43 In this respect, the state would 
cease to fulfil its primary function of protecting its people and instead render universal the 
‘impossibility of defense’.44 His assertion regarding the future inability of the state to provide 
security would attract the ire of Kalevi Holsti, who dubbed Herz a ‘necrologist’ for dismantling a core 
tenet of realist IR and announcing prematurely the demise of the state.45 This is a caricature but Herz 
was in a minority of American realists confident enough to query the nature and prospects of the 
state.46 Just as the new weapons jeopardised the integrity of the state, so too would they damage 
irrevocably prospects for collective security.47 
 
Herz admitted later to underestimating the stabilising influence of deterrence, which weakened the 
potency of his original argument,48 but his core commitment to potential nuclear extinction was 
unwavering in his early post-war career. Van Munster and Sylvest situate the John Herz of this 
                                                          
42 Peter Stirk, ‘John H. Herz: Realism and the Fragility of the International Order’, Review of International 
Studies 31, no. 2 (2005): 299, suggests Herz’s realism is singular in asserting that nuclear weapons altered the 
structure of international order. 
43 John H. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 61. 
44 Ibid., 168-69. 
45 K.J. Holsti, ‘The Necrologists of International Relations’, Canadian Journal of Political Science 18, no. 4 
(1985): 675-95.  
46 Alexander B. Murphy, ‘The Sovereign State as Political-Territorial Ideal’, in State Sovereignty as Social 
Construct, eds. Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 118. 
47 Herz, International Politics, 93-95. 
48 Bryan Mabee, The Globalization of Security: State Power, Security Provision and Legitimacy (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 74; John H. Herz, ‘The Territorial State Revisited: Reflections on the Future of the 
Nation-State’, Polity 1, no. 1 (1968): 11-34. 
13 
 
period, alongside prominent intellectuals like Lewis Mumford, Günther Anders and Bertrand Russell, 
in an intellectual orientation they call ‘nuclear realism’.49 These scholars strove to imagine brighter 
futures for a global society overshadowed by post-war technological, specifically thermonuclear, 
developments and by an overweening scientific rationality instrumentalising human life rather than 
enhancing it for its own sake. The four were bound together by a common insight: ‘liberal modernity 
could survive collective suicide only by radically rethinking and transforming its foundations’.50 For 
his part, Herz critiqued the roles of science and rationality in developing the means of omnicide, and 
the technocratic language and absurdities of civil defense and the putative ‘winnability’ of nuclear 
war.51 In typically Herzian style, he wrote: ‘The age-old dream of the mass-killers of history, which 
found a relatively modest realization in a Tamerlane’s skull-mountains or even in Hitler’s gas 
chambers, now, thanks to the progress made in the technology of destruction, seems finally to be 
fully attainable’.52 
 
For Herz, science and technology were also implicated in the second major source of existential 
threat. Although he would not write at length on issues of environmental degradation, 
overpopulation, resource depletion and pollution until later in his career, Herz was keenly aware of 
these issues since at least the late 1940s.53 In this respect, he was far in advance of most scholars of 
international politics. By 1959, he was discussing overpopulation and resource sustainability in the 
same breath as nuclear annihilation. In terms that seem prescient today, he noted the 
environmental threat was ‘no less deadly than that of the atom bomb and possibly even more so 
                                                          
49 Van Munster and Sylvest, Nuclear Realism.  
50 Ibid., 2. 
51 John H. Herz, ‘International Politics and the Nuclear Dilemma’, in Nuclear Weapons and the Conflict of 
Conscience, ed. John C. Bennett (London: Lutterworth Press, 1962), 33. It is surely no coincidence this critique 
followed publication of Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1960), which promoted the possibility of nuclear ‘victory’. Herz elsewhere took aim at ‘scientific’ IR; John H. 
Herz, ‘Relevancies and Irrelevancies in the Study of International Relations’, Polity 4, no. 1 (1971): 25-47; John 
H. Herz, ‘Political Realism Revisited’, International Studies Quarterly 25, no. 2 (1981): 182-97. 
52 Herz, International Politics, 228. See also, John H. Herz, ‘The Impact of the Technological-Scientific Process 
on the International System’, in Herz, The Nation-State, 172-94. On Herz’s attitude to technology, see Casper 
Sylvest, ‘Technology and Global Politics: The Modern Experiences of Bertrand Russell and John H. Herz’, The 
International History Review 35, no. 1 (2013): 121-42. 
53 John H. Herz, The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics (New York: David McKay, 1976), 4, fn. 2. 
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because it is less obvious and less spectacular [which] permits the unenlightened, if they perceive it 
at all, to postpone serious consideration and concern’.54 This combination of nuclear and 
environmental threat was a potent one and Herz intended to find new modes of engagement with 
this potentially catastrophic state of global affairs.55 After all, as he noted, ‘For the first time in the 
earth’s history a species boldly calling itself Homo sapiens possesses the factual resources and 
should have the wisdom to secure its continuance’.56 
Survival ethics and practice 
In a tautological restatement of Wight’s maxim, Herz stated that ‘thinking about how to survive 
means thinking about international politics’.57 Throughout the 1950s, he developed his own 
framework for international political thought, which paid great attention to extinction and survival 
within what he called ‘realist liberalism’.58 This was not an attempt to graft onto one mode of 
thinking an incommensurate other but a desire to balance a realist view of the world as it is with 
greater collective goals. This was not an easy undertaking in theory or practice.59 Despite its 
apparent incoherence, realist liberalism might perhaps be characterised as the recognition that 
human extinction could best be allayed by developing a sensitivity to common interests. To tackle 
the sources of existential threat outlined above, one common interest had to be survival of the 
human species as a whole, rather than maintaining its fragmentation along national lines. ‘The 
common interest in survival’, he wrote, had to be prioritised over the traditional interest in seeing 
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one’s adversaries fail.60 Herz was unafraid to call this perspective ‘universalist’ but sought to distance 
his brand of universalism from utopianism of any kind, which he regarded as ‘unrealizable’, despite 
its attractive aspects.61 He called not for world government, as some critics supposed, nor claimed 
an inevitable victory for the powers of reason or order. On the contrary, he recognised the 
emergence of a universalist mindset as highly contingent and probably quite unlikely.62 Yet, he 
believed it a necessary step towards preventing human extinction and promoting ‘survival in a world 
that had become mortally vulnerable for even the mightiest’.63 For Herz, this was an acute ethical 
proposition, articulated many times across his work. One instance is worth reproducing in full: 
 
It is my thesis that because in today’s world, for the first time, the survival of all is in 
jeopardy, even those who (like myself) are value-relativists (i.e. believe that, in principle, no 
‘ought to’ can be derived from an ‘is’) can agree that, when certain values become so 
overwhelming important that their nonrecognition appears absurd to practically everybody 
engaging in human discourse, those values can be posited as certain or undeniable. Where 
the alternative to the ‘ought to’ denotes physical extinction of the entire human race, 
survival, not of individuals or specific groups but of mankind as such, becomes an absolute 
value.64 
 
Herz explicitly combined, therefore, a political realism with an ethical idealism, resulting in what he 
termed a ‘survival ethic’.65 This was applicable to all humankind and its propagation relied on the 
generation of what he termed ‘world-consciousness’.66 Herz’s implicit recognition of an open yet 
linear temporality allowed him to imagine possible futures aligned with the survival ethic, whilst at 
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the same time imagining futures in which humans become extinct. His pessimism about the latter 
did not preclude working towards the former. 
 
As Herz recognised, it was one thing to develop an ethics of survival but quite another to translate 
theory into practice. What was required was a collective, transnational and inherently 
interdisciplinary effort to address nuclear and environmental issues and to problematize notions of 
security, sustainability and survival in the context of nuclear geopolitics and the technological 
transformation of society. Herz proposed various practical ways in which young people in particular 
could become involved in this project. One idea floated in the 1980s, which would alarm many in 
today’s more cosmopolitan and culturally-sensitive IR, was for a Peace Corps-style ‘peace and 
development service’, which would ‘crusade’ to provide ‘something beneficial for people living 
under unspeakably sordid conditions’ in the ‘Third World’.67 He expended most of his energy, 
however, from the 1980s onwards, in thinking about and formulating ‘a new subdiscipline of the 
social sciences’, which he called ‘Survival Research’.68 
 
Informed by the survival ethic outlined above, and within the overarching framework of his realist 
liberal internationalism, Survival Research emerged as Herz’s solution to the shortcomings of 
academic research, public education and policy development in the face of global catastrophe.69 It 
was also Herz’s plea to scholars to venture beyond the ivory tower and become – excusing the 
gendered language of the time – ‘homme engagé, if not homme révolté’.70 His proposals for Survival 
Research were far from systematic but they reiterated his life-long concerns with nuclear and 
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environmental issues, and with the necessity to act in the face of threats to human survival. The 
principal responsibilities of survival researchers were two-fold. One, to raise awareness of survival 
issues in the minds of policy-makers and the public, and to demonstrate the link between political 
inaction now and its effect on subsequent human survival. Two, to suggest and shape new attitudes 
more ‘appropriate to the solution of new and unfamiliar survival problems’, rather than relying on 
ingrained modes of thought and practice.71 The primary initial purpose, therefore, of Survival 
Research would be to identify scientific, sociocultural and political problems bearing on the 
possibilities of survival, and to begin to develop ways of overcoming these. This was, admittedly, 
non-specific and somewhat vague, but the central thrust of his proposal was clear: ‘In our age of 
global survival concerns, it should be the primary responsibility of scholars to engage in survival 
issues’.72 Herz considered IR an essential disciplinary contributor to this endeavour, one that should 
be promiscuous across the social and natural sciences. It should not be afraid to think the worst, if 
the worst is at all possible, and to establish the various requirements – social, economic, political – 
of ‘a livable world’.73 How this long-term project would translate into global policy is not specified 
but, consistent with his previous work, Herz identified the need for shifts in attitudes to and 
awareness of global problems and solutions. Only then would it be possible for ‘a turn round that 
demands leadership to persuade millions to change lifestyles and make the sacrifices needed for 
survival’.74 
Productive pessimism and temporality 
In 1976, shortly before he began compiling the ideas that would become Survival Research, Herz 
wrote: 
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For the first time, we are compelled to take the futuristic view if we want to make sure that 
there will be future generations at all. Acceleration of developments in the decisive areas 
(demographic, ecological, strategic) has become so strong that even the egotism of après 
nous le déluge might not work because the déluge may well overtake ourselves, the living.75 
 
Of significance here is not the appeal to futurism per se, although this is important, but the 
suggestion this is ‘the first time’ futurism is necessary to ensuring human survival. This is Herz the 
realist declaring a break with conventional realism: Herz is not bound to a cyclical vision of political 
or historical time in which events and processes reoccur over and again. His identification of nuclear 
weapons as an ‘absolute novum’ in international politics demonstrates this belief in the non-cyclical 
nature of humankind’s unfolding temporality.76 As Sylvest observes of Herz’s attitude to the nuclear 
revolution, ‘the horizons of meaning it produced installed a temporal break with the past, and 
simultaneously carried a promise for the future’.77 
 
This ‘promise for the future’ was not, however, a simple liberal view of a better future consonant 
with human progress. His autobiography is clear that his experiences of Nazism and the Holocaust 
destroyed all remnants of any original belief in ‘inevitable progress’.78 His frustration at scientism, 
technocratic deception, and the brutal rationality of twentieth-century killing, all but demanded a 
rejection of the liberal dream and the inevitability of its consummation. If the ‘new age’ ushered in 
by nuclear weapons, he wrote, is characterised by anything, it is by its ‘indefiniteness of the age and 
the uncertainties of the future’; it was impossible under these conditions to draw firm conclusions 
about the future course of international politics.79 Instead, he recognised the contingency, precarity 
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and fragility of international politics, and the ghastly tensions inherent to the structural core of 
international politics, the security dilemma.80  
 
Herz was uneasy with both cyclical and linear-progressive ways of perceiving historical time. The 
former ‘closed’ temporalities are endemic to versions of realist IR, the latter to post-Enlightenment 
narratives feeding liberal-utopian visions of international relations and those of Marxism.81 In their 
own ways, each marginalises and diminishes the contingency of the social world in and through 
time, and the agency of political actors in effecting change. Simultaneously, each shapes the futures 
that may be imagined and brought into being. Herz recognised this danger. Whilst drawing attention 
to his own gloomy disposition, he warns that without care and attention, ‘the assumption may 
determine the event’.82 As a pessimist, Herz was alert to the hazard of succumbing to negativity, 
cynicism or resignation. E.H. Carr recognised this also, in the difference between the ‘deterministic 
pessimism’ of ‘pure’ realism and those realists ‘who have made their mark on history’; the latter may 
be pessimists but they still believe ‘human affairs can be directed and modified by human action and 
human thought’.83 Herz would share this anti-deterministic perspective with Carr. Moreover, the 
possibility of agency is a product of a temporality ‘neither temporally closed nor deterministic, 
neither cyclical nor linear-progressive; it is rooted in contingency’.84 
 
Again quoting from his autobiographical account of the impact of Nazism, Herz described the 
relationship between his early pessimism and his developing intellectual stance: 
 
The world became a theatre of the absurd. Suicide would probably have been the logical 
next move, and I considered it from time to time. But I was still too young for such a radical 
                                                          
80 Stirk, ‘John H. Herz’. 
81 Hom and Steele, ‘Open Horizons’. 
82 Herz, International Politics, 24, 31. 
83 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001 [1939]), 87, quoted in Seán P. Molloy, ‘Pragmatism, Realism and the 
Ethics of Crisis and Transformation in International Relations’, International Theory 6, no. 3 (2014): 462. 
84 Hom and Steele, ‘Open Horizons’, 279. 
20 
 
step. One thing, however, emerged: a growing interest in domestic and, above all, 
international politics. My complete resignation was no longer appropriate. If not from 
within, fascism might perhaps still be destroyed from without. To my continuing interest in 
theory, therefore, was added a practical interest in action.85  
 
Channelling the spirit of E.H. Carr, he wrote of this ‘brutal awakening’ to the nature of power politics 
in the 1930s that, ‘Study could no longer be “pure” research; it had to become research committed 
to warn of the deadly peril and show the way to the necessary action.’86 His commitment to active 
engagement was an early one, gestated during his personal experiences of Nazism in the 1930s.87 
This desire to combat Nazism from the outside was manifest in his activities for the Allies during and 
after World War II but it coloured his scholarly life also. Herz recognised pessimism was a powerful 
force in his life but, rather than overcome or mask it, he used it to propel his intellectual project 
further, and to engage with, not withdraw from, the world. He was, as van Munster and Sylvest 
relate, ‘[d]eeply pessimistic yet a committed social thinker’.88 
 
Herz was explicit about this: a realistic and consistent pessimism can clarify where we are and 
prepare us to do what is necessary.89 Pessimism is a necessary component of a realistic view of the 
world, upon which proper and reasoned action can be founded. In this sense, pessimism can be 
productive. It produces positive outcomes through action, rather than negative ones through 
inaction or resignation. These are subjective value-judgements, to be sure, but are obtained through 
a process of realist engagement with the world, rather than blind fumbling or ideological railroading. 
Survival Research was a response to Herz’s pessimism about the future, not a rejection of it. This 
leads us to two observations about the relevance of pessimism to the study of international 
relations. 
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The first is that pessimism does not imply disengagement from the world. If anything, the example 
of John Herz suggests the opposite. He was a pessimist, but his brand of pessimism was no ‘passive 
fatalism’.90 As he recalled a few years before he died, ‘I consider myself a realist who comes 
sometimes to pessimistic conclusions, but never gives up looking for solutions if ever so difficult 
ones’.91 Pessimism can be a spur to thought and to action and need not be a watchword for 
conservatism in theory or practice.92 This is not to say being a pessimist is easy. Morgenthau, for his 
part, ‘never flagged in efforts to use his conceptual skills to help improve the human condition’, 
despite his pessimism about the ability and will of people to take the long view on significant 
political issues.93 This required that scholars chart different paths through troublesome times and 
articulate alternative visions of international order, not to preclude political action but to facilitate it; 
not quite the conservative position realism is often assumed to occupy.94 In the face of worldly 
frustrations and horrors, it is this attention to the production of alternative futures that prevents 
‘pessimism from turning into fatalism’.95 
 
The second observation is that it is unhelpful and misleading to treat pessimism and optimism as 
oppositional.96 Pessimism and optimism are commonly regarded as antonyms but often enjoy a 
symbiotic relationship. In Herz, they mingle and cross-pollinate in ways that defy easy explication.  
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Stirk claims, for instance, that Herz’s optimism about how the world could be refashioned ‘was never 
more than guarded’, restrained by his fierce attachment to the importance of the security 
dilemma.97 Puglierin notes that his ‘blatant pessimism’ (eklatanter Pessimismus) was always 
accompanied by some form of optimism.98 We are reminded of Gramsci’s famous statement 
regarding ‘pessimism of intellect, optimism of the will’ as the cognitive binary at work in the political 
mind.99 Even as his pessimism deepened over the course of his career, he was always wont to end 
his analyses with a ‘yet’ or ‘in spite of it all’.100 Importantly, as he became more pessimistic, ‘the 
solutions he proposed became ever more ambitious’.101 His growing pessimism was accompanied by 
increasing resolve to tackle the problems of the world head-on, although, as he admitted in a 
footnote in the 1980s, ‘Not for a moment do I have the illusion that what I have proposed is likely to 
happen’.102 A suitably pessimistic aside, perhaps, but it did not deter him from continuing his project 
for another twenty years. This drive seems not to be rooted in optimistic conviction, nor even a 
subtle version of hope, but in a properly pessimistic reading of the world and its possibilities, 
engendered as they were by the ontological temporality of perpetual change. 
Productive pessimism and International Relations 
If intellectual pessimism has any utility to IR today, it is worth examining whether Herz’s pessimism 
led to anything more concrete than sketches for an interdisciplinary research programme. Arguably, 
it did not. On the one hand, it is hard to argue that many of his pessimistic expectations have not 
come to pass.103 On the other, Herz’s concerns about nuclear and environmental risk did not lead to 
substantive contributions to scientific or policy debates.104 Ned Lebow asserts that whilst Herz is 
most famous for coining and theorizing the security dilemma, he is ‘most inspiring’ to contemporary 
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scholars for his Survival Research proposals.105 If this is the case, inspiration has yet to translate into 
sustained engagement with this aspect of his work, even though Survival Research had by the end of 
his life replaced IR as his principal disciplinary orientation.106 That he did not have the effect on the 
world he might have hoped must have occasioned some personal regret but his commitment 
displayed, as a friend remarked after his death, that John Herz was ‘a realist not a defeatist’.107 
Determination and perseverance may be necessary allies of a well-developed pessimism. 
 
It is notable also, as IR begins to engage with the existential implications of the Anthropocene, that 
Survival Research not been more widely recognised.108  Programmes for research and action 
proposed by critical scholars have much in common with Survival Research’s interdisciplinarity and 
universalism.109 Survival would also seem to be a primary logical concern for scholars of the 
Anthropocene, the stratigraphic denotation of which necessarily implies its own eventual demise. 
Herz’s omission from these accounts may be due to his pessimism, his apparent unwillingness to 
articulate a bright, ‘affirmative’ ethics for a then-unnamed Anthropocene.110 However, his vision is 
not so different: the historical moment identified by Herz then and critical scholars now thrusts upon 
humankind both the responsibility to act and the opportunity to do so. How to act is the key 
consideration, therefore, and it is true that Herzian Survival Research is long on ambition and short 
on detail. His close friend, Kenneth Thompson, was moved to ask if Herz was developing a ‘coherent 
plan’ or a ‘crusade’: Herz ‘tells us little about what has been done and even less about guides to 
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action’, he complained, adding, in a swipe at Herz’s realist credentials, that he seemed to be 
proposing not only a ‘new international system’ but a ‘new man’ too.111 Realists, the argument goes, 
can only ‘deal with the world as it is, not as it should be.’112 From a realist perspective, Herz is not 
realist enough; from a critical perspective, Herz is sufficiently realist to be irreparably antagonistic to 
the critical project and therefore barely worth considering. Even its critics note, however, that 
political realism ‘prescribes a way to live in light of its pessimistic interpretation of human political 
relations’.113 One may not agree with their prescriptions but most realists, as Michael Desch submits, 
‘study world politics in order to make it more humane and just within the limits of what 
international anarchy allows’.114  
 
Nevertheless, aspects of Herz’s project are problematic. Superficially, for instance, Survival Research 
is laden with rampant anthropocentrism. Herz’s preoccupation with extinction concerns the death of 
the human species above all others. This is unequivocal in his own words and in any reasonable 
secondary analysis. Herz therefore falls short of developing a nuanced appreciation of the 
entanglements of human and nonhuman life.115 Yet, Herz does not ignore nonhumans, or the facts 
of their survival and extinction. His concerns with environmental carrying capacity, ecological 
sustainability, pollution and overpopulation, all implicitly recognise humankind is ensnared in and 
dependent on the ‘web of life’.116 Moreover, as previously noted, Herz’s pessimism grew from 
disillusionment with modernity, in which he identifies – as early as 1942 – a rupture between society 
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and Nature in language and content familiar today from the work of Bruno Latour, inter alios.117 In 
one analysis of this predicament, Herz noted that Nature is not ‘in the least concerned about the 
existence or disappearance of mankind’.118 Whilst we should query the construction of Nature as an 
analytical category, and the consequent problems that arise, this is not a scholar unaware of the 
radical decentring of humanity from the cosmos. Herz’s project is anthropocentric but not to the 
boorish exclusion of other life or environments.   
 
A second criticism stems from the global pretensions of Survival Research. Herz performs two 
essential manoeuvres in setting up the problem of survival and extinction. The first is spatial, the 
second temporal. Herz, like other scholars gathered under the ‘nuclear realist’ umbrella, had a 
‘resolutely global vision’.119 Not unreasonably, Herz saw nuclear and environmental problems as 
global, and their potential solutions in a similar light. In so doing, however, Herz reproduces his own 
historically situated vision of the world and casts it globally as a single, ‘universal’ space and time. If, 
as Kimberly Hutchings suggests, the aspiration of such a project is to be ‘globally prescriptive’, rather 
more attention to the diversity and heterogeneity of life-worlds would be required in order to satisfy 
even minimal standards of a global ethics.120 Again, however, this apparently politically incorrect 
gambit stems not from ignorance but from a specific wish to avoid ‘special’ or ‘parochial’ interests 
correlated with specific ethnic, economic or political identities.121 For Herz, ‘going global’ was a 
necessary step towards solving the problems at hand, not a desire to project a particularised 
Western, liberal version of scientifically-informed truth. Nevertheless, this sits uneasily with 
contemporary sensibilities in academic IR. 
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Conclusion   
Towards the end of his life, John Herz quoted wryly from a New York Times article exploring the 
primary difficulty faced by leaders attempting to mobilise concern around survival issues: ‘Optimists 
are cast as winners, pessimists as losers’.122 In contrast, Herz was unafraid to embrace pessimism 
and use it productively in thinking about international politics. Through an exploration of the themes 
of extinction and survival in the work of John Herz, this article suggests that pessimism is more 
nuanced than its everyday connotations of resignation, cynicism and inaction imply. If pessimism is 
seeing the world as it is, or likely will be, there is no a priori reason why pessimism should be less 
valuable than any other attitude to global life and society. Moreover, rather than pessimism being 
solely affective or a deeply emotional response to the world, it can be a respectable intellectual 
position in its own right. It also expresses assumptions about the temporal topologies of the future. 
Pessimism, in the putatively classical realist form explored here, for instance, is an expression of a 
temporal orientation described as ‘open’ yet ‘linear’, in both its future visions and its acceptance of 
the ontological contingency of the world. Herz understood his brand of pessimism was not a barrier 
to imaginative thought but a spur to it. It was also not an obstacle to action, as his commitment to 
Survival Research demonstrates. Pessimism is not an all-consuming misery or abandonment of 
reason. It need not induce apathy or inaction or, worse, cynicism and withdrawal. It is not bound to 
prevent, in today’s academic argot, ‘engagement’ or ‘impact’. For Herz, pessimism led to ‘a sense of 
concrete urgency and the realization of the utter practicality of world-mindedness’,123 neither of 
which can necessarily be deduced from conventional readings of pessimism. In the work of Herz, we 
can identify a strong and fertile pessimism that helped foster a lifelong commitment to solving 
international problems. This article proposes we pay greater attention to the nature and character of 
such pessimism in international politics and IR, seeking not just to recover it but to pluralise and 
disaggregate it, and to examine its potential for productive engagements inside and outside the 
academy. 
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